Surveying newspapers spanning multiple countries and four centuries, we identify four eras of employment-related advertising (neither workers nor …rms regularly posted ads, mostly workers posted, mostly …rms posted, both parties regularly posted). Modeling the job matching process as a strategic coordination game, we identify multiple equilibria suggesting three complementary explanations for transitions across eras: an increase in …rm size over time, an increase in worker mobility and a reduction in search frictions, and a decrease over time in the workers'relative value of labor versus unemployment. The model exhibits a discontinuous welfare function, suggesting important policy implications for job matching.
Introduction
The matching of job seekers to employers is a fundamental subject in labor economics that also has implications for macroeconomic discussions of unemployment. Furthermore, understanding the impacts of many labor market and macroeconomic policies hinges on what we know about the job matching process.
The matching framework (e.g. Pissarides 2000, Mortensen and Pissarides 1999) posits a matching function that summarizes, in the aggregate, the outcomes of encounters between job seekers and recruiting employers. The matching function re ‡ects the transaction costs and search frictions arising from imperfect information.
1 To combat these frictions, both sides of the market can in ‡u-ence the matching function by making investments that improve information. Although search-related investments are implicit in the matching function, they are rarely the primary objects of research interest.
3 Furthermore, when search strategies are in the spotlight the focus is typically on the behavior of only one side of the labor market, and strategic interactions between the job seeker and the employer are ignored. 4 Our goal is to learn about the job matching process by investigating how advertising behaviors of employers and job seekers have changed historically and by developing an explanatory theoretical framework that accounts for strategic interactions in these investments.
We start by reading the employment-related ads in newspapers -lots of them, spanning over four hundred years, multiple languages, and locations as diverse as Austria, England, Ireland, Scotland, the United States and its original colonies, Jamaica, Barbados, India, and seventeenth-century Strasbourg. Based on this reading, we identify four eras in advertising history. Until the 19th century, newspaper ads posted by either employers or job seekers were rare, and we call this the "Pre-Ad era". When ads began to appear regularly starting in the nineteenth century, those posted by job seekers tended to dominate the market, and we call this the "Early era". For example, the October 24, 1871 edition of
The New York Times contained 138 employment-related ads, only 8 of which were employer-posted "Help Wanted"ads, featuring a dozen positions for cooks, canvassers, coachmen, seamstresses, chambermaids, waitresses, laundresses, and an opportunity in a life insurance o¢ ce. The remaining 130 were "Situations
Wanted" ads, divided into a section for females and another for males. A dramatic reversal then occurred, such that by the late twentieth century nearly all ads were posted by employers, and we call this the "Modern era". For example, the October 24, 1971 edition of The New York Times contained thousands of ads, and we estimate that about 96 percent of them were posted by employers.
5
So less than 6 percent of the ads on October 24, 1871 were employer posted, versus 96 percent in the same newspaper, on the same date, a century later.
Finally, the advent of the internet allowed electronic ads to be posted at low cost, resulting in today's signi…cant volume of online posting by both sides of the labor market. 6 We call this the "Internet era". After documenting these intriguing observations, we develop a theoretical model that can explain all of them. The model exhibits equilibria corresponding to each of the four eras and suggests several complementary explanations for the historical evolution across the equilibria.
Although we focus on the labor market, the question of which side of the market should undertake search-related investments is quite general, and for that reason the theory we develop could apply to other matching markets (e.g.
the rental housing market, in which both sides of the market regularly post 5 Sunday, October 24, 1971 can be considered a randomly selected date, except to the one of us who was born on it! Since the ads on that date are so numerous, we approximated the fraction posted by employers. The main collection of ads spans all of Section 9 (pages 1-34). Each column of text on a page contains dozens of individual ads, and there are 303 columns of ads in total in Section 9. Fewer than 12 of those columns contain "situations wanted" ads posted by job seekers. These numbers form the basis for our estimate of 96 percent, though in fact the fraction of total ads placed by employers was even larger, since there are some other locations in the newspaper containing scattered employer-posted ads. For example, ads can be found in the business section between pages 17 and 30, and ads for teachers can be found on pages 12 and 13 of Section 4. 6 It is now common for job seekers to post ads (typically in the form of résumés on sites like monster.com and professional networking sites like LinkedIn) as well as employers.
3 on websites such as craigslist). The following example illustrates the generality of the investment problem. Two blindfolded individuals are randomly located at di¤erent positions on an empty playing …eld. Their objective is to …nd each other to collect a shared prize, and the rules prevent them from communicating.
Each is free to remove his blindfold at a cost. If neither chooses to do so, they might never …nd each other. If one of them removes the blindfold, they should …nd each other easily, and a positive externality is created by the party who invests. And given that one of them removes the blindfold, there is little bene…t to the other of removing the blindfold, which creates the potential for free riding.
There are four possible outcomes: both blindfolds remain on, both are removed, or two distinct ways in which only one is removed. But which outcome(s) prevail, and why? In the special case of the labor market, our review of the newspaper evidence reveals that the four "blindfold outcomes" are reminiscent of the four advertising eras that have occurred historically.
Our model is a strategic game of coordination involving N homogeneous job seekers and a single …rm that could employ up to N workers. 7 In the …rst of three stages, workers and the …rm simultaneously decide whether to post an ad and whether to read the newspaper in search of ads. If the …rm decides to read ads, it also chooses how many ads to read. Both posting and reading are costly activities for workers and the …rm. Matches occur in the second stage, with match probabilities in ‡uenced by who posts and reads in the …rst stage. Hiring occurs in stage 3, when payo¤s accrue to both sides of the labor market in the form of wages and pro…ts.
In the simplest case of a two-player game with one worker (n = 1) and one …rm, the model exhibits the following four pure-strategy equilibria, analogous to the four "blindfold outcomes"from our example: neither side posts or reads, both sides post and read, the …rm posts and the worker reads, or the worker posts and the …rm reads. In the more interesting case of multiple workers, an additional equilibrium emerges. More precisely, the model exhibits …ve purestrategy equilibria. In the type-A equilibrium, neither side posts, and neither side reads. In the type-B equilibrium the …rm posts but does not read ads, and all workers read ads but do not post them. In the type-C equilibrium the …rm 7 Our assumption of homogeneous preferences di¤ers from the matching literature, originating with Gale and Shapley (1962) and subsequently developed by Roth and others, in which heterogeneity of preferences is key. The notion of match stability is therefore irrelevant in our model, and our welfare analysis has a somewhat di¤erent ‡avor. In the matching literature, social welfare hinges on the exact con…guration of matches, whereas in our model one match is as good as any other, and the welfare analysis hinges on the likelihood that a match occurs at all and on who pays the investment costs to increase the likelihood of a match. reads ads but does not post, and all workers post but do not read ads. In the type-D equilibrium the …rm and all workers post and read ads. The type-E equilibrium matches the type-D equilibrium but with the following di¤erence.
Only some of the workers post, and the …rm reads fewer ads than in the type-D equilibrium. We also extend the model to two …rms. Although the analysis becomes largely intractable in that case due to a proliferation of potential pure strategy equilibria, we can show that equilibria exist that have similar properties to those in the single-…rm model.
The equilibria just de…ned match or approximate the behaviors we have observed in the historical record. The Pre-Ad era was characterized by essentially no posting (and therefore presumably little reading) by either side of the market and is well described by the type-A equilibrium. Advertising in the Early era was dominated by job seekers, although a small fraction of employer-posted ads also appeared, and there are two ways to understand this era in the context of our model. One possibility is that the equilibrium of type D applies, and perhaps E during the later part of this era as the fraction of worker-posted ads shrinks.
Another possibility is that equilibria of types B and C were both sustainable during this era, implying that the structure of the game resembles that of battle of the sexes. The observed behavior could then be explained in two ways: either some people failed to coordinate on the correct equilibrium or some occupations and industries played equilibrium B and others played C. The Modern era in which advertising was dominated by employers is well described by the type-B equilibrium. The current Internet era in which both sides regularly post and read online ads is well described by the type-D equilibrium.
We attribute the transition from the Pre-Ad to the Early era to decreases in the costs of posting and reading ads that occurred because of increasing literacy rates, which in turn were fueled by the technological progress that accompanied the Industrial Revolution and by the growth of public school systems. Similarly, we attribute the transition from the Modern to the Internet era to decreases in the costs of posting and reading ads that occurred because of the Internet Revolution. We provide three complementary explanations for the transition from the Early to the Modern era: a growth in …rm size over time, an increase in job mobility and a reduction in search frictions over time, and an increase over time in the jobseekers'outside option of unemployment, due to the emergence of social insurance programs in the twentieth century. We elaborate on all of these explanations after developing the theoretical model.
This work relates to a literature on recruitment that dates back at least as far as Malm (1954 Malm ( , 1955 . The role of employer recruitment strategies as an information generating device was …rst expored in Rees (1966) .
8 Since Rees and Shultz (1970) , much of the literature on recruitment and worker job search has focused on the role of informal methods (such as soliciting referrals from current employees, friends, or relatives) in labor market matching. For example, Pinkston (2012) and Simon and Warner (1992) formal methods such as newspaper advertising generate a larger applicant pool from which the employer can be more selective. Our focus is on formal methods (and in particular advertising) rather than informal methods.
The work also relates to a growing literature on two-sided markets (or networks). 11 These markets involve a "platform" that facilitates transactions between two "end users", getting both parties "on board". For example, a credit card platform connects buyers and vendors; the credit card network can attract customers if stores accept its card, but stores will only accept the card if there are many customers. In our context, the platform is the newspaper, the end users are job seekers and employers, and "getting both sides on board" means commencing an employment relationship. This corresponds to the rough de…n- 8 The crucial role that information plays in the labor market has been appreciated since Stigler (1962) .
9 See also Loury (2006 ), Castilla (2005 , Kugler (2003) , Mencken and Win…eld (1998) , Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994) , Montgomery (1991) , Blau and Robins (1990 ), and Holzer (1987 ,1988 . While the idea that informally recruited new hires could yield better matches became popular following Rees (1966) and Rees and Shultz (1970) it had also been noted earlier. For example, Reynolds (1951) discussed a retention bene…t deriving from workforce congeniality and residential co-location.
1 0 See also Brenµ ciµ c (2009), Barron et al. (1997) , Gorter et al. (1996), van Ours and Ridder (1992) , and Roper (1988) .
1 1 See, for example, Tirole (2003, 2006) , Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) , Rysman (2009 ), Weyl (2010 , and Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2011). ition of a two-sided market o¤ered in Rochet and Tirole (2006) , which cited the newspaper as an example that competes for advertisers as well as "eyeballs".
The theory relates to an older literature on network externalities (originating with Katz and Shapiro 1985 and 1986 , and Farrell and Saloner 1985 and 1986 by assuming that there are non-internalized externalities among end users. For example, if a store accepts a credit card, it creates a positive externality for customers who want to use that card. In our model, the …rm creates positive externalities for the workers by posting or reading ads, and workers create positive externalities for each other and for the …rm by posting or reading ads.
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Our model delivers important and unexpected welfare implications. For example, policies that hinder job mobility and increase search frictions can actually enhance welfare, if they su¢ ciently weaken the incentive of one side of the market to free ride on the investments of the other. The positive externalities resulting from the additional investments that occur when both sides of the market post and read ads may outweigh the negative e¤ect on welfare of a reduction in job mobility and increase in search frictions. Similarly, small labor market interventions to increase job mobility and reduce search frictions can lead to large reductions in welfare that arise when one side of the labor market is induced to free ride on the investments made by the other side, thereby lowering the positive externalities associated with search-related activities. An implication of these arguments is that policies aimed at reducing the costs of posting and reading ads may be superior to those designed to increase job mobility and reduce search frictions. More generally, because of the multiplicity of equilibria, changes in the model parameters (from policy interventions or for other reasons) change welfare in two ways. First, conditional on a speci…c equilibrium being played, changes in the model parameters a¤ect workers'and …rms'payo¤ in this equilibrium. Second, changes in the model parameters may induce workers and …rms to behave di¤erently, i.e. to switch to a di¤erent equilibrium. Because of this latter e¤ect, a small change in one of the model parameters may have a large e¤ect on welfare (i.e. the welfare function is discontinuous). This gives 1 2 Given our assumption that there is no scarcity in jobs, workers'decisions to post or read ads impose no negative externalities on other workers, though assuming a job slot constraint would change that and would guarantee equilibrium unemployment. Similarly, even without scarcity in the number of potential jobs, workers' decisions to post would impose negative externalities on each other if the …rm's probability of discovering a given worker's ad were a decreasing function of the number of worker ads posted. This modeling assumption would be a way to capture a congestion e¤ect. We abstract from job scarcity and congestion, since these features would complicate the analysis without deepening the model's insight, so the only non-internalized externalities are the positive ones just stated.
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rise to a range of policy implications such as those just described.
2 Employment-related advertising: a tour through the Times Employment-related advertising has surely existed, in some form, for as long as there have been labor markets. One longstanding method of advertising that is still used is physically posting a visible indicator, such as a "Help Wanted" sign, in a public area or storefront window. This method is simple, e¤ective, and cheap, though a downside is that people must attend the physical location to notice the ad, and they have no way of knowing in advance whether they will …nd an ad if they visit a particular location.
13 Today, the problem of reaching a large audience without requiring readers to travel to a physical location has been solved by the internet, and ads increasingly appear on job matching sites like monster.com, or on professional networking sites like LinkedIn. The electronic ad, however, is a recent phenomenon. Between these two extremes of the internet and physically posted ads lies the newspaper, which emerged in the early seventeenth century. 14 For centuries preceding the advent of the internet, the newspaper o¤ered both sides of the labor market their best option to reach a widely dispersed audience at a reasonable cost.
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The advent of the newspaper induced a massive drop in the cost of disseminating information quickly to a large audience spread over a wide geographic area, so it is natural to expect that the newspaper would have evolved rapidly into an important vehicle for labor market matching. But our investigation suggests that employment-related newspaper advertising did not become a regular phenomenon until the nineteenth century. To establish this fact, we read 1 3 This method is also used by the other side of the labor market. For example, in some California cities job seekers congregate in a collectively known location that is frequented by roo…ng contractors (e.g., a Home Depot). When the contractors arrive at the store to purchase the materials needed for that day's work, they hire these day laborers on the spot to help with the roo…ng projects for that day. Thus, the job seekers advertise their availability by "posting" their own physical presence at a given location.
1 4 As noted in Weber (2006) , the …rst newspaper appears to be Relation aller Fürnemmen und gedenckwürdigen Historien, which was founded in Strasbourg in 1605 and published in German.
1 5 Televised job ads have never been very popular. Even though they can reach a large audience immediately and without requiring consumers to attend a particular location, the cost of air time is high. Furthermore, a newspaper can be read at one's leisure, and the reader knows where in the newspaper to …nd all of the ads in one place. In contrast, television ads appear individually and sporadically and must be consumed contemporaneously. 8 many newspapers, printed in both English and German, spanning many geographic areas, and dating back to 1609. Although we provide a summary in To document what happened during the period of regular posting that emerged in the nineteenth century, we provide a tour through the histories of two celebrated and currently circulating newspapers, namely The Times of London and of New York. 17 We begin with the London newspaper. Table 2 displays a tour through The Times, from 1785 through 1991. We examined the October 24 editions at intervals of a decade, stopping in 1991 since that was the last year for which we had convenient micro…lm access and because that date was su¢ ciently late for our purposes. 18 If October 24 fell on a Sunday during a year in which The Times did not have a Sunday edition, we used the edition from an adjacent day. Our objective was to see whether employment-related ads were posted mostly by employers, mostly by job seekers, or regularly by 1 6 We did a particularly thorough investigation of The Maryland Gazette, starting with the 1745 issues that were readily available to us on micro…lm. Founded in 1727, The Gazette is one of the oldest newspapers in the United States. Perusing many issues, we found no employment-related ads from 1745 through the early nineteenth century. 1 7 We selected these newspapers because of their long histories, international reputations and stature, and diverse geographic locations. According to Wikipedia, the printed version of The New York Times remains the largest local metropolitan newspaper in the U.S. and the third-largest newspaper overall, behind The Wall Street Journal and USA Today. The New York Times website receives more than 30 million unique visitors per month (Adams 2011) making it the most popular newspaper website in the U.S. The London newspaper was founded on January 1, 1785 as The Daily Universal Register. On January 1, 1788, it changed its name to The Times, becoming the …rst of many newspapers in the world to bear that name. Since the arrival of other Times newspapers (e.g. The New York Times ), the longer title "The London Times " has often been used for distinguishing purposes. The New York newspaper was founded in 1851 as The New-York Daily Times, dropping the hyphen and the "Daily " in 1857.
1 8 We also considered a number of other randomly selected dates to assure ourselves that there is nothing special about October 24. 9 both sides of the labor market. In most years we provide an exact count of ads, though we provide approximations for years in which the quantity of ads is overwhelmingly large or in which counting is otherwise inconvenient. As seen in the …rst three rows of Table 2 , the absence of ads in 1785 and 1795 and the paucity of ads in 1805 are consistent with the conclusion we drew from Table  1 . Table 2 reveals that employment-related ads were not a regular phenomenon until the nineteenth century was well underway.
The next several rows of Table 2 reveal that when employment-related ads became a regular …xture in the newspaper, they were dominated by job seekers rather than by employers. The year 1845 was an exception given that the Taken together, Tables 1 and 2 reveal that prior to the Industrial Revolution a "Pre-Ad" era prevailed with little or no posting by either side of the market, and near the end of the Industrial Revolution a new era emerged in which ads were regularly posted and were more commonly placed by job seekers than by employers (the exception of 1845 notwithstanding). We refer to this period, which lasted throughout the nineteenth century, as the "Early era". From 1815 to 1905 (and excluding the 1845 anomaly) the average of the entries in Table   2 is 20 percent, so that 4 out of every 5 ads in the newspaper over the course of nearly a century were placed by job seekers rather than by employers. For the period preceding the railway boom, i.e. 1815 to 1835, the average entry in Table 2 suggests that about 88 percent of ads were posted by job seekers. Our model exhibits a type-D equilibrium in which both sides of the market post ads, and a type-E equilibrium (in which employers post but only some workers post)
that might match better the later part of the Early era when the fraction of ads posted by job seekers was shrinking. Another possible interpretation of the Early era is that it re ‡ects a blend of type-B and type-C equilibria, with either of these equilibria applying to certain occupations or industries. The Modern era ended with the advent of the internet at the end of the twentieth century, which revolutionized employment-related advertising. By the early twenty-…rst century both employers and job seekers were regularly posting online ads to capitalize on the reduced advertising costs and widened audiences that electronic distribution allows. 19 This era is characterized by the strong resurgence of ads posted by job seekers. In October 2013, on the homepage of monster.com, the very …rst link was "Resumes" which allows the user to post a résumé, and the second link was "Jobs"which allows the user to search a database of employment opportunities. This is poignantly reminiscent of how, throughout the Early era, the "Situations Wanted"ads were placed …rst in the newspaper, followed by a smaller "Help Wanted"section. This fourth and ongoing "Internet era" is well described by our model's type-D equilibrium.
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the transition from the Early era to the Modern era by plotting the numbers in Table 2 . We begin the plot in 1815 because in 1785 and 1795 there were no ads posted by either side, and in 1805 there were only three ads, which we see as an extension of the Pre-Ad era depicted in Table 1 . 
A model of advertising and labor market matching
We now develop a theoretical model to explain the evidence in the preceding section. For simplicity, we focus on the case of a single …rm, though later we relax this assumption and consider the case of two …rms. The model has three stages.
In stage 1, N unemployed workers choose whether to post an ad and whether to look for an ad posted by the …rm. At the same time the …rm, which seeks to hire up to N workers, chooses whether to post an ad and whether to look for ads posted by the workers. If the …rm decides to look for ads posted by the workers, it also decides how many ads to read. Denote this number by k. All choices are made simultaneously. Posting an ad costs the …rm c p > 0, and looking for an ad costs c l > 0 (per ad). We assume that posting an ad is more costly than looking for a single ad, hence c p > c l . Since our newspaper evidence spans multiple centuries, illiteracy was widespread in the population of job seekers for much of the timespan we study. We therefore assume that there are two types of workers (literate and illiterate) that di¤er in their costs of posting and looking for ads.
For literate workers these costs are c p and c l , whereas for illiterate workers both costs are in…nitely high. Thus, illiterate workers never decide to post or to look for ads, and we therefore focus on the decisions of literate workers. We denote the fraction of literate workers by 2 [0; 1] and de…ne n := N as the number of literate workers.
In stage 2, if the …rm has posted an ad, a worker who is looking for an ad reads (or …nds) the posted ad with probability 2 (0; 1), in which case the worker contacts the …rm. Similarly, if m workers have posted ads, the …rm -if looking for k ads posted by workers -reads each of the posted ads with probability min 1; 20 Second, may account for impediments to mobility. For example, if a job seeker reads an ad that was posted by a …rm, he might not respond to the ad if he faces mobility constraints or feels the …rm is located too far away. In all these situations, a worker-…rm match is not formed even though one side posts and the other side looks for ads. This possibility is captured by assuming < 1.
If the …rm contacts a worker or if a worker contacts the …rm, the …rm hires the worker in stage 3 and earns a (gross) payo¤ of u F > 0, and the worker's (gross) payo¤ from the match isû W > 0. A worker's reservation utility, i.e. the payo¤ that the worker receives if he is not hired by the …rm, is denoted by u 0 ,
In summary, a worker i's strategy is a tuple (p W i ; l W i ) 2 f0; 1g f0; 1g,
where p W i = 1 means that worker i posts an ad, and l W i = 1 means that the worker looks for ads posted by the …rm. Similarly, the …rm's strategy is a tuple (p F ; l F ) 2 f0; 1g f0; :::; ng, where p F = 1 means that the …rm posts an ad, and l F = k means that the …rm looks for k ads posted by workers.
We focus on equilibria in pure strategies. If a party is indi¤erent between a lower and a higher action (for example, if worker i is indi¤erent between choosing p W i = 0 and p W i = 1), we assume that the party always opts for the higher action (which in the example would be p W i = 1).
We assume that job seekers are free agents, though in the earlier historical periods of our analysis slavery was common. For our analysis, the possibility of slavery does not alter anything fundamental. Like conventional labor, slave labor involves an exchange of money for labor services, and the labor market matching problem is similar for the two types of labor, with two main di¤er-ences. First, in the context of slavery the payment goes to the worker's current owner rather than to the worker, but from the …rm's standpoint it does not really matter who gets the payment. Second, and more importantly, slavery introduces a non-synchronization in revenues and costs in that all wage payments are front loaded in a lump sum payment in exchange for a future stream of "free" labor services. This non-synchronization shifts risk onto the employer, which is presumably re ‡ected in the price. A richer, dynamic model incorporating such nuances should leave our main results unchanged, and in any event our present static model with …xed wages permits an interpretation in which some of the job seekers are slaves. As for the data, newspaper ads from both sides of the slave labor market appear in the historical record, though they are not voluminous.
Our reading suggests that most ads that concern slaves are posted by owners of runaway slaves with the hope of recovering lost property. This was especially so in the eighteenth-century issues of The Maryland Gazette we canvassed.
Model solution and comparison of equilibria
Worker i is hired by the …rm either if he posts an ad that is read by the …rm (event A i ) or if he reads an ad that is posted by the …rm (event B i ). The hiring probability is thus given by
Worker i chooses (p W i ; l W i ) to maximize
Similarly, the …rm chooses (p F ; l F ) to maximize
From the …rm's expected payo¤ function we can derive the following lemma:
Lemma 1 In equilibrium the …rm either chooses l F = 0 or l F = P j p W j .
In the following, we consider the two cases l F = 0 and l F = P j p W j . Suppose …rst that l F = 0. Then worker i's objective becomes
whereas the …rm's expected payo¤ is
The following proposition characterizes equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 1 There are two types of equilibria in which the …rm chooses l F = 0: (i) An equilibrium in which the …rm chooses (p F ; l F ) = (0; 0) and all workers choose (p W i ; l W i ) = (0; 0) always exists. Payo¤ s are U F = 0 and U W i = u 0 .
(ii) An equilibrium in which the …rm chooses (p F ; l F ) = (1; 0) and each worker chooses (p W i ; l W i ) = (0; 1) exists if and only if n u F c p 0 and u W c l 0.
Expected payo¤ s are U F = n u F c p and
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. If the …rm decides neither to post an ad nor to look for worker-posted ads, no workers will be hired. The workers thus minimize their costs by choosing (p W i ; l W i ) = (0; 0). By the same argument, if all workers choose (p W i ; l W i ) = (0; 0), a best response for the …rm is (p F ; l F ) = (0; 0). Obviously, as no worker-…rm match is formed and no costs are incurred, the …rm earns zero pro…t and each worker receives the reservation utility u 0 .
A more interesting equilibrium is described in the second part of the proposition. Here, the …rm and workers coordinate on an equilibrium in which the …rm posts an ad and all workers look for ads. Of course, this equilibrium can only exist if posting an ad or looking for ads is not too costly.
Let us now assume that P j p W j > 0 and the …rm selects l F = P j p W j . Suppose in addition that the …rm chooses p F = 0, in which case a best response by all workers is l W i = 0 (and vice versa). Notice that objective functions of worker i and the …rm are then given by
From worker i's objective function it is easy to see that P j p W j > 0 is satis…ed if and only if u W c p 0, in which case all workers …nd it optimal to choose p W i = 1. In turn, the …rm is willing to choose l F = P j p W j = n if and only if u F c l 0. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2 An equilibrium in which the …rm chooses (p F ; l F ) = (0; n) and each worker chooses (p W i ; l W i ) = (1; 0) exists if and only if u F c l 0 and
Proposition 2 highlights a di¤erent way for the …rm and the workers to coordinate. It describes a situation in which all workers post an ad, and the …rm looks for ads. Again, this equilibrium can only exist if the costs of posting or reading an ad are not too high.
Finally, equilibria may exist in which
and l W i > 0 for at least one worker i. The …rm's objective function could be stated as
whereas worker i's expected payo¤ is
The following lemmas are helpful for deriving the two remaining equilibria, which are stated in Propositions 3 and 4.
Lemma 2 In an equilibrium in which the …rm chooses l F > 0 and p F = 1, none of the workers …nds it optimal to choose (p W i ; l W i ) = (0; 0).
Lemma 3 Consider an equilibrium in which the …rm chooses l F > 0 and p F = 1. If (at least) one of the workers chooses (p W i ; l W i ) = (1; 1), none of the workers chooses (p W i ; l W i ) = (1; 0).
Lemma 4 An equilibrium in which the …rm chooses (p F ; l F ) = (1; k) (with 0 < k < n); k workers choose (p W i ; l W i ) = (1; 0), and n k workers choose (p W i ; l W i ) = (0; 1) does not exist.
Proposition 3 There exists an equilibrium in which the …rm chooses (p F ; l F ) = (1; n) and each worker chooses (p W i ; l W i ) = (1; 1) if and only if
Proposition 4 There exists an equilibrium in which the …rm chooses (p F ; l F ) = (1; k) (with 0 < k < n); k workers choose (p W i ; l W i ) = (1; 1), and n k workers choose (p W i ; l W i ) = (0; 1) if and only if
Expected payo¤ s are
Propositions 3 and 4 demonstrate that equilibria potentially exist in which the …rm and some (or all) of the workers decide to post an ad and simultaneously to read ads. Note that existence of these equilibria requires that not be too high (and c p and c l must not be too high either). This is intuitive. Consider a worker who has decided to look for ads and who is considering whether to post an ad. If is close to 1 the worker can be con…dent that he will …nd the ad posted by the …rm, so that posting an ad is not worthwhile.
To summarize, we have demonstrated the potential existence of the following …ve types of equilibria:
We now use two criteria to approach the problem of equilibrium selection. First, it is possible that, depending on the parameter constellations, only some equilibria can be sustained. This allows us to focus on the sustainable equilibria, which may even yield a unique prediction regarding equilibrium play. Second, in situations in which there exists more than one equilibrium, we use payo¤ dominance as a selection criterion whenever possible. This means that if at least two equilibria exist and if one of the equilibria dominates all other equilibria in terms of payo¤ (i.e. all workers and the …rm receive the highest payo¤ in this equilibrium), we assume that the dominant equilibrium is played. Proposition 5 concerns the existence of equilibria, whereas Proposition 6 refers to payo¤ dominance.
Proposition 5 (i) There always exists an equilibrium of type A.
(ii) If there exists an equilibrium of type D or E, there also exists an equilibrium of type B and C. The converse is not necessarily true.
(iii) Existence of an equilibrium of type B does not imply existence of an equilibrium of type C and vice versa.
(iv) Existence of an equilibrium of type D does not imply existence of an equilibrium of type E and vice versa.
Proposition 6 (i) Whenever an equilibrium of type other than A exists, this equilibrium payo¤ dominates the equilibrium of type A.
(ii) Suppose that the equilibria of type B and C exist. B payo¤ dominates C if and only if c p nc l , whereas C never payo¤ dominates B.
(iii) Whenever the equilibrium of type D exists, D payo¤ dominates all other equilibria.
(iv) Suppose the equilibrium of type E exists. E payo¤ dominates the equilibrium of type B. E payo¤ dominates C if and only if k (1 ) u F + (n k) c l c p , whereas C never payo¤ dominates E.
Welfare implications
In this section we investigate how the welfare of workers and the …rm depends on the parameters of our model. Changes in the parameters a¤ect the parties' welfare in two ways. First, conditional on a speci…c equilibrium being played, changes in the parameters a¤ect workers' and the …rm's payo¤ in this equilibrium. Second, changes in the parameters may induce workers and the …rm to behave di¤erently, i.e. to switch to a di¤erent equilibrium. Let us begin with the …rst e¤ect. From the equilibrium payo¤s displayed in Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4 it is straightforward to see that increases in c p and c l have a non-positive e¤ect on the payo¤s that workers and the …rm receive in any equilibrium, whereas increases in u W , u F , and n have a non-negative e¤ect on these payo¤s. Moreover, conditional on a particular equilibrium being played, all payo¤s are continuous functions of c p , c l , u W , u F , and n, i.e. small changes in these parameters have a small impact on payo¤s.
We use two examples to illustrate the second e¤ect. Suppose that c l = 0 so that the existence conditions for the equilibria of type B, C and D collapse to 
Since 2 (1 ) u ĉ p = (1 ) u > 0, total welfare is discontinuous atĉ p .
This means that a small decrease in c p (e.g. by subsidizing the cost of posting an ad) may generate a large increase in welfare. This example is illustrated graphically in Figure 3 , assuming u = 100 and = 0:1. The graph is discontinuous when the equilibrium switches to D from B or C, and when the equilibrium switches to B or C from A.
A second interesting observation relates to . Suppose again that c l = 0, n = 1 and u F = u W =: u. In addition, assume that initially 0:5 and
(1 ) u c p so that the worker and …rm play the equilibrium of type D.
Now suppose that increases. Since (1 ) u is decreasing in , the condition
(1 ) u c p eventually ceases to be met, in which case the worker and …rm switch to a di¤erent equilibrium in which their payo¤s are lower. This implies that although in each of the considered equilibria payo¤s are non-decreasing in , an increase in may lead to a reduction in total welfare, so that the welfare function is both discontinuous and non-monotonic in . This discontinuity is illustrated in Figure 4 , which assumes u = 100, c l = 10, and c p = 20. The …gure also reveals two additional points of discontinuity for values of less than 0.5.
If we return to the general model and assume that the equilibrium switches from D to B, the decrease in welfare is n[ (1
. This decrease in welfare grows when the investment costs shrink. The type-D equilibrium is the most active one, given that both sides of the market do both activities. From a welfare standpoint, the advantage of this situation is that the positive externalities of these activities are maximized when everyone undertakes them, whereas the disadvantage (which is particularly pronounced when costs are large) is that everyone incurs all costs. Switching from equilibrium D to B (or C) reduces the positive externalities associated with each activity, while also reducing costs because one side of the market free rides on the activity of the other. This reduction in costs is modest when c p and c l are low, so that the more important factor driving the welfare change is the reduction in positive externalities, which implies a big drop in welfare when moving from equilibrium D to either B or C. The drop in welfare is also increasing in u F and u W because those parameters represent the returns to a match, and a switch from equilibrium D to B (or C) reduces the likelihood of a match. Finally, the drop in welfare is increasing in n.
Collectively, these results concerning have some interesting and unexpected policy implications. Small labor market interventions to increase job mobility and reduce search frictions -which intuitively would seem to enhance welfare as long as the costs of implementing the policies are modest -can in some cases lead to large reductions in welfare that arise when one side of the labor market is induced to free ride on the investments made by the other side, thereby lowering the positive externalities associated with search-related activities. Such welfare losses are likely to be greater the larger the market (i.e. n), the larger the returns to a match (i.e. u F and u W ) and the smaller the search-related costs (i.e. c p and c l ). An implication is that countries may di¤er in their expected bene…ts from policies to increase . For example, less developed countries (for which u F and u W are likely to be low) may face a lower downside risk than developed countries, since any welfare reductions that might arise from a transition from equilibrium D to B (or C) are likely to be modest. Standard economic intuition suggests that in the presence of positive externalities there is underinvestment and that policies to encourage investment can be welfare enhancing. In the present model, policies that hinder job mobility and increase search frictions can be welfare enhancing in some cases if they su¢ ciently weaken the incentive of one side of the market to free ride on the investments of the other. The positive externalities resulting from the additional investments may outweigh the negative e¤ect on welfare of the reduction in job mobility and increase in search frictions. Consider two alternative ways a policymaker could intervene.
One is to increase , and the other is to decrease c p and/or c l . Abstracting from the costs of the alternative policies, our analysis suggests that the latter may be the better choice for two reasons. First, if the economy is in equilibria B or C, a reduction in search costs increases welfare continuously but may also induce a sharp increase in welfare if the economy enters equilibrium D. Second, if the economy is already in equilibrium D, a reduction in search costs increases welfare continuously but without the risk of tipping the economy into the inferior equilibria B or C involving free riding.
6 Explaining the historical evolution of job advertisements Before applying our model to propose possible explanations for the historical evolution of advertising behavior documented in Section 2, we address some alternative explanations that were suggested to us by others. One common reaction to the pattern of evidence in Figures 1 and 2 is that it might be explained by changes in the relative bargaining power of workers and …rms over time, caused either by institutions (e.g. the abolition of slavery or the introduction and growth of unions) or by market forces (i.e. shifts in supply and demand for labor). In the context of our model, changes in relative bargaining power can be interpreted as changes in the relative values of u F and u W . We feel that explanations based on slavery or unions can be eliminated based on timing.
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Market forces that shift the demand and supply of labor can also be a reason for a changing balance of bargaining power between workers and …rms. Perhaps when there are relatively few vacancies (job seekers) it is the job seekers (employers) who need to invest in persuasion. Our argument that the 1845 spike in Figure 1 can be attributed to the railway boom in London is consistent with labor market tightness a¤ecting posting behavior. However, this cannot be the only (or even the main) explanation for the pattern of evidence, for at least two Turning to our model, the Pre-Ad era covered in Table 1 and the …rst three rows of Table 2 is best described by our model's equilibrium of type A. Although posts were occasionally seen during this period on either side of the market, they were quite rare. What followed was an era of regularly posted ads, dominated by worker-posted ads, that lasted roughly throughout the nineteenth century.
Recall from Table 3 that the average fraction of ads posted by New York City employers was less than 5 percent in the years 1861, 1871, and 1881. Keeping in mind that the number of workers that are looking for a job exceeds the number of …rms that hire workers, our type-D equilibrium can be thought of as an approximation to this situation. As noted earlier, another possibility is that equilibria of types B and C occur simultaneously, implying that the structure of the game resembles that of "battle of the sexes". The observed behavior could then be explained in two ways: either some people failed to coordinate on the correct equilibrium or some occupations and industries played equilibrium B whereas others played C. We now turn to a potential explanation for the shift from the Pre-Ad era characterized by the type-A equilibrium to the Early era characterized by the type-D equilibrium (or the joint occurrence of equilibria of type B and C). Our impression is that the timing of this transition suggests that it arose from increases in literacy rates (driven by the Industrial Revolution and the growth of public schools).
As Tables 1 and 2 reveal, the type-A equilibrium clearly prevailed around 1760 at the start of the Industrial Revolution, whereas by the end of the Industrial Revolution the new era of regularly posted ads was emerging. The technological innovations of the Industrial Revolution brought new manufacturing processes that lowered the production costs of paper, books, and other printed materials, making them more a¤ordable for all social classes. These changes facilitated improvements in literacy rates. 24 In the context of our model, a situation in which most of the economic agents are illiterate can be thought of as one in which is extremely low. In the extreme case, is equal to zero which means that all people that are out of work and looking for a job are illiterate.
Obviously, posting an ad or looking for ads is neither optimal for the …rm nor for the workers in this situation, so that the type-A equilibrium prevails. When literacy expanded (because of the Industrial Revolution), the costs of posting and reading ads dropped substantially for the workers who became literate. As a consequence, it is conceivable that the type-C equilibrium emerged, with workers demonstrating their newly acquired skills by posting ads and …rms looking for these worker-posted ads.
Further promulgating literacy, in New York City the education system became public in every respect when the schools of the Public School Society were turned over to the city's …rst Board of Education (established in 1842),
propelling the system in both growth and e¤ectiveness for the remainder of the century (Palmer 1905) . By 1904 the city's system had 546 school buildings, more than 13,000 teachers, a growing registration of 622,000 students, and national recognition for quality (Palmer 1905) . 25 In London, the Newcastle Report of 1861 urged the provision of "sound and cheap" elementary schools for working class children between the ages of 5 and 13, and in 1870 Parliament passed the Elementary Education Act (The Forster Act) to implement those recommendations (Gillard 2009 ).
2 4 As noted in West (1978) , "It is generally agreed by all participants that people were more literate at the end of the Industrial Revolution period, 1760-1840, than they were at the beginning." See also Figure 1 of that study, which documents a sharp decrease in the annual percentage of males and females unable to sign at marriage, in England and Wales from 1839 to 1912, and Figure 2 , which documents a sharp decrease in the annual percentages of illiterate male and female school leavers (as determined by their inability to sign the marriage register 15 years later) from 1820 to 1900.
2 5 In 1904 New York City's schools won multiple gold medals at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition in Missouri, and in the same year Harvard's president (Charles William Eliot) stated that "New York City has produced a system of public instruction which the whole country may well copy." (Palmer 1905) A similar argument to the preceding can explain the transition from the Modern era to the Internet era that occurred in the late twentieth and early twenty-…rst centuries. The advent of the internet led to a signi…cant decrease in the costs of posting and reading ads.
26 This led to a transition from the type-B equilibrium in which employers posted ads to a type-D (or type-E) equilibrium in which both …rms and job seekers posted (online) ads. In the context of our model, the decrease in posting cost implies c p (1 ) min fu W ; u F g, where in the Modern era this inequality was reversed. This switching of the inequality allows the type-D equilibrium to be sustainable. As noted earlier, the type-D equilibrium dominates all other equilibria with respect to payo¤ and is therefore selected. Hence, we observe both …rms and workers posting ads. In the following subsections we propose three complementary explanations for the transition from the Early era to the Modern era.
Size of …rms
As Figure 2 in Poschke (2011) shows for the US, …rms have grown in size over time, and the biggest growth seems to have occurred between 1940 and 1980.
This simple observation has the potential to explain the historical change in advertising behavior. In our model, an increase in …rm size can be captured by an increase in N , which causes an increase in n. First consider the Early era. Suppose that c l < c p min fu W ; u F g, but c p > (1 ) u W and c p > nc l . Then only the equilibria of type A, B and C exist. 27 The equilibrium of type A is dominated with respect to payo¤ and is therefore never selected.
The equilibria of types B and C do not dominate each other and can both be selected. 28 Therefore, we sometimes observe …rms posting ads and sometimes workers posting ads. Next consider the Modern era, and note that the growth in …rm size over time means that now c p nc l . In this case the equilibrium of type B dominates the equilibrium of type C with respect to payo¤, so that the latter equilibrium is no longer played. Intuitively, if n increases, the …rm gets 2 6 Lower costs have also facilitated greater detail in the content of employment-related postings, company and personal websites, and Facebook pages. Brenµ ciµ c and Norris (2009) …nd that the average length of an online job description is about 2553 characters long (about one page), which signi…cant exceeds the length of the typical job ad that was printed historically in the newspaper.
2 7 To see that the equilibria of type D and E do not exist, note that cp
overwhelmed by a large number of worker ads to read. The …rm and all workers then maximize their payo¤s when the …rm posts an ad and workers read this ad. Therefore, we only observe …rms posting ads, as was true in London and New York in the early 1990s, as seen in Figures 1 and 2. 
Job mobility and search frictions
Search frictions and impediments to worker mobility have decreased over time, due to the increasing dissemination of information and to a reduction in transportation costs. In the context of our model, a reduction in search frictions implies an increase in . Such a change could explain the historical evolution of advertising behavior. First, consider the Early era, and suppose that c p
(1 ) min fu W ; u F g, c p < nc l and > 0:5. In this case the equilibrium of type D exists and is selected, so that we observe both …rms and workers posting ads. Next consider the Modern era. The increase in over
. Accordingly, the equilibrium of type D no longer exists. As described in Section 5, the intuition for a worker who expects the …rm to post and read ads is as follows: 29 By posting and reading ads instead of simply reading ads, the worker increases the probability of being hired from to 2 2 but also incurs the cost of posting an ad. If is relatively high, the probability di¤erence 2 2 = (1 ) is low, so that the worker is not willing to incur the cost of posting an ad. However, the equilibria of types B and C (in which only one market side posts ads) exist.
Because c p < nc l the equilibrium of type B dominates the equilibrium of type C with respect to payo¤, so that the former equilibrium is played. We therefore observe only …rms posting ads in the late twentieth century.
Incremental gain from being hired
It is likely that the di¤erence in utility from being hired by a …rm versus being unemployed has decreased over time. This is because around the turn of the twentieth century the absence of social security systems meant that unemployment imposed particularly high costs on workers. As the twentieth century progressed and social security systems developed (e.g. the New Deal policies of the US in the 1930s), the costs of being unemployed diminished. In the context of the model, this implies that u 0 became higher and, as a consequence, u W became lower between the Early and Modern eras. This can explain the historical shift in the pattern of job advertisements. First, consider the Early era, and suppose that c p (1 ) min fu W ; u F g and c p < nc l . Then the equilibrium of type D exists and is selected, so that we observe both …rms and workers posting ads. Next consider the Modern era. Compared with the Early era, u W has decreased over time so that c p (1 ) u W and even c p u W are now violated. Accordingly, the equilibria of types C and D no longer exist. Intuitively, because of the development of social security systems and the resulting decrease in u W , workers are no longer willing to incur the cost of posting an ad to …nd employment. The equilibrium of type B, however, exists and is played.
Therefore, we only observe …rms posting ads in the late twentieth century.
Multiple Employers
Thus far, we have made the simplifying assumption that there is only one …rm in the market. With more than one …rm the analysis becomes complex because of a proliferation of potential equilibria. In this section, we consider the case of 2 …rms (indexed by j = 1; 2) and demonstrate that equilibria exist which have very similar properties to those from Section 4.
We assume that if both …rms read an ad posted by a worker, each …rm hires the worker with probability 0:5. Furthermore, if the worker chooses l W i = 1
and if both of the …rms have posted an ad, the worker …nds one of the posted ads with probability 1 (1 ) 2 = (2 ), in which case the worker stops looking for a second ad. The worker …nds each of the posted ads with the same probability.
Using similar arguments as in the basic model, we can derive the following four propositions:
Proposition 7 An equilibrium in which each …rm chooses (p F j ; l and
Proposition 10 An equilibrium in which each …rm chooses (p F j ; l F j ) = (1; n) and each worker chooses (p W i ; l W i ) = (1; 1) exists if and only if
Expected payo¤ s are U F j = 0:5 1 (1 ) 4 nu F c p nc l and
The four equilibria outlined in Propositions 7 to 10 possess properties similar to those of the corresponding equilibria from the basic model with one …rm.
First, it is immediate that the equilibrium described in Proposition 7 is payo¤ dominated by any of the three other equilibria whenever such an alternative equilibrium exists. Second, the equilibrium described in Proposition 8 payo¤ dominates the equilibrium from Proposition 9 if c p < nc l . In addition, for su¢ ciently small c p and c l the equilibrium described in Proposition 10 payo¤ dominates the three preceding equilibria. Therefore the arguments from Section 6 are likely to apply in the case of two competing …rms.
Concluding Remarks
To understand the four eras of advertising history and the transitions across them, we developed a theoretical framework emphasizing strategic interactions in the search-related investments of job seekers and employers. A direct consequence of accounting for strategic behavior is discontinuity and non-monotonicity in the social welfare function, which has a number of potentially important policy implications, some of which we have highlighted. Our model shows that small policy changes can have large e¤ects on welfare and that the predicted 
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. It is straightforward to see that the …rm never chooses l F higher than P j p W j , because starting from l F = P j p W j , the marginal return to the …rm from increasing l F is zero (since min n 1;
, whereas the marginal cost is strictly positive. Hence, we can rewrite min n 1;
, and the …rm's objective function becomes
As the function is linear in l F , it is maximized either at l F = 0 or at l F = P j p W j .
Proof 
condition is obviously met.
Proof of Proposition 3. It is easy to see that the …rm's expected payo¤ in equilibrium is
If the …rm were to deviate to (p F ; l F ) = (1; 0), this payo¤ would become
Similarly, in case of a deviation to (p F ; l F ) = (0; n) or (p F ; l F ) = (0; 0), the …rm's payo¤ would change to n ( u F c l ) or zero, respectively. Hence, the …rm does not deviate from (p F ; l F ) = (1; n) if and only if
implying u F c l 0. Hence, the existence condition can be restated as
or equivalently as
Again, it is straightforward to verify that worker i 0 s equilibrium payo¤ is 
Moreover,
implying u W c l > 0. Accordingly, the existence condition simpli…es to
Proof of Proposition 4. It is easy to see that the …rm's expected payo¤ in equilibrium is
Similarly, in case of a deviation to (p F ; l F ) = (0; k) or (p F ; l F ) = (0; 0), the …rm's payo¤ would change to k ( u F c l ) or zero, respectively. Hence, the …rm does not deviate from (p F ; l F ) = (1; k) if and only if
Notice that
Hence, the existence condition simpli…es to
Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that worker i 0 s equilibrium payo¤ is 
u W c l always exceeds k k+1 u W c p , and because of (1 ) u W c p it is also strictly positive. Therefore, the condition can be restated as
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) See Proposition 1. (ii) Suppose there exists an equilibrium of type D or E. Then, it must be that
From the …rst condition we see that (2
We therefore see that the respective existence conditions for the equilibria of type B and C must be ful…lled. Finally, it is straightforward to give an example for which the existence conditions for the equilibria of types B and C are ful…lled, whereas those for the equilibria of types D and E are violated.
(iii) Even if n u F c p 0 and u W c l 0 (so that the equilibrium of type B exists), it is conceivable that c p > u W (so that the equilibrium of type C does not exist). Similarly, even if u F c l 0 and u W c p 0 (so that C exists), it is conceivable that c p > n u F (so that B does not exist).
(iv) Existence of the equilibrium of type E requires (among other things)
Even if this condition is met, it is conceivable that
is violated and the equilibrium of type D does not exist. When c p ; c l ! 0, the equilibrium of type D always exists. However, the condition
is clearly violated so that the equilibrium of type E does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) From the existence conditions it is straightforward to see that both …rms and workers receive higher expected payo¤ in an equilibrium of type other than A than in the equilibrium of type A whenever the corresponding equilibrium exists.
(ii) Since c l < c p , it immediately follows that workers receive a higher expected payo¤ in the equilibrium of type B than the equilibrium of type C.
Therefore, C never payo¤ dominates B. I¤ c p nc l , the …rm also receives a higher expected payo¤ in B than in C.
(iii) Assume that the equilibrium of type D exists. The existence conditions already state that the …rm's expected payo¤ and all workers'expected payo¤s must be higher in this equilibrium than in the equilibria of types A, B and C.
Hence, if the equilibrium of type E does not exist, the …rst claim is proven.
Suppose now that the equilibrium of type E exists as well. The expected payo¤ for workers who choose (p W i ; l W i ) = (1; 1) in the equilibrium of type E is the same as their payo¤ in the equilibrium of type D. Consider the in-
holds if the equilibria of type D and E exist. The inequality states that workers who choose (p W i ; l W i ) = (0; 1) in the equilibrium of type E are worse o¤ in this equilibrium than they are in the equilibrium of type D. Finally,
the …rm receives a higher expected payo¤ in the equilibrium of type D than in the equilibrium of type E.
(iv) Suppose that the equilibrium of type E exists. From the existence conditions, we can conclude that the k workers choosing (p W i ; l W i ) = (1; 1) receive a higher expected payo¤ in E than they would in either B or C. Similarly, since c l < c p the n k workers choosing (p W i ; l W i ) = (0; 1) receive expected payo¤ that is not lower than their payo¤ in either B or C. It follows that neither B nor C can payo¤ dominate E. From the existence conditions it also follows that the …rm's expected payo¤ is higher in E than in B, hence E payo¤ dominates
(n k) c l c p , the …rm's expected payo¤ in E also exceeds the expected payo¤ in C, in which case E also payo¤ dominates C.
Proof of Proposition 7. When each worker chooses (p W i ; l W i ) = (0; 0), a best response for each …rm is to choose (p F j ; l F j ) = (0; 0). Similarly, when each …rm chooses (p F j ; l F j ) = (0; 0), a best response for each worker is to choose (p W i ; l W i ) = (0; 0). Therefore, the described strategy pro…le constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Since …rms do not hire any workers in this equilibrium, payo¤s are
Proof of Proposition 8. Note that in equilibrium each worker is hired with probability (2 ). For …rm j the only pro…table deviation could be to (p F j ; l F j ) = (0; 0). The …rm does not want to deviate in this way i¤ 0:5 (2 ) nu F c p 0. For worker i the only pro…table deviation could be to (p W i ; l W i ) = (0; 0). The worker does not want to deviate in this way i¤
Proof of Proposition 9. Note that in equilibrium each worker is hired with probability (2 ). Note further that …rm j's payo¤ function is again linear in l F j . Hence, if the …rm were to deviate from (p F j ; l F j ) = (0; n), it would deviate to (p F j ; l F j ) = (0; 0). The …rm does not want to deviate in this way i¤ 
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